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declarations of intent within the legally operative text. Second, the 2001 reinforcement 
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of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the WIPO 
Development Agenda. Finally, the continued use of Articles 7 and 8 to influence political 
discourse on matters relating to intellectual property regulation. While it may be 
premature to suggest that Articles 7 and 8 are a customary part of the international IP 
system, the above information provides compelling evidence for greater investigation into 
their meaning in order to facilitate future recognition by the DSB.  
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1 
THE ‘OBJECTIVES’ AND ‘PRINCIPLES’ OF THE WTO TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: A DETAILED ANATOMY  
ALISON SLADE1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A striking feature of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)2 is the bold expression of purpose contained within the 
operative sections of the text. While, it is commonplace to see broad declarations of intent 
within the preambular sections of key international IP treaties,3 the TRIPS Agreement is the 
first to articulate such objectives and give them apparent operative force.  Articles 7 and 8 
refer to the ‘Objectives’ and ‘Principles’ of the treaty regime respectively: 
 
  Article 7 - Objectives 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations. 
 
 Article 8 - Principles 
(1) Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
                                                
1 Brunel Law School, Brunel University London. Alison.slade@brunel.ac.uk. I would like to thank Professor 
Graeme Dinwoodie and Professor Professor Benedict Chigara for their extensive and valuable comments on 
earlier drafts. As always, any errors or omissions are my own.  
2 1869 UNTS 299 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
3 See, for example, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 828 UNTS 221 
(entered into force 9 September 1886, last amended 28 September 1979); and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996 
36 ILM 65 (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002).  
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sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
(2) Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by rights 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. 
 
Their inclusion in Part I of the Agreement entitled ‘General Provisions and Basic Principles’, 
recognises Articles 7 and 8 as ‘structural’ provisions that affect all other areas of the 
Agreement.4 These provisions ‘overarch the object and purpose of individual standards of 
protection in the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement.’5 Consequently, Articles 7 and 8 ‘are 
to be systematically applied in the implementation and interpretation of the Agreement.’6 The 
structural, overarching and systematic application of these provisions draws legal authority 
from the General Rule of Interpretation codified in Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This states that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in light of its object and purpose.’7 Established as binding on the WTO when interpreting 
all covered agreements8, it prescribes a single and holistic rule of interpretation that 
emphasises the importance of the treaty language. Nonetheless, any meaning attributed to the 
text must be determined in the context of the treaty and in light of its object and purpose.9 
Articles 7 and 8 feature in the application of VCLT rule of interpretation, most significantly 
                                                
4 Graeme B Dinwoodie & Rochelle C Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the 
International Intellectual Property Regime (OUP 2012) 109-111. 
5 Susy Frankel, ‘Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes’ (2009) 
12 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1023, 1037. 
6 Carlos M. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (OUP 2007) 93. 
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1153 
UNTS 331.  
8 WTO, United States: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline – Report of the Appellate Body 
(29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, 15-16. 
9 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press 1984) 119-135.  
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by providing context and object and purpose for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.10 
Support for this understanding is derived from Article 31.2 of the VCLT which defines 
context to include the entire text, preamble and annexes, as well as any connected agreements 
or instruments that have been made between or accepted by all parties. Additionally, 
designating Articles 7 and 8 as objectives and principles is a strong indication that these 
provisions are relevant for assessing the treaty’s object and purpose.11 In fact, this specific 
role for Articles 7 and 8 has subsequently been reinforced by the WTO Membership through 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.12  
Given that Member States took positive steps to include expressions of general intent 
within the operative section of the text, it is also remarkable that Articles 7 and 8 have 
received only minimal attention from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).13 Much has 
been written about the DSB’s insubstantial analysis and application of these provisions in 
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products14 and European Communities – 
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs15. In both cases the panels acknowledge these provisions, but seem to accept them 
                                                
10 Susy Frankel, ‘WTO Application of “the customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to 
Intellectual Property’ (2006) 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 366, 392. Andrew D Mitchell & Tania Voon, ‘Patents and Public 
Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, (2009) 43 J. World Trade 
571, 573. A brief discussion of the good faith obligations, including good faith interpretation derived from 
Article 31.1 VCLT, can be found at the text accompanying footnotes 111-114. For a detailed discussion of the 
good faith obligations created by Article 7 please refer to Alison Slade, ‘Good Faith and the TRIPS Agreement: 
Putting Flesh on the Bones of the TRIPS ‘Objectives’’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 353. 
11 Susy Frankel, ‘WTO Application of “the customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to 
Intellectual Property’ (2006) 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 366, 392.  
12 WTO, ‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – Adopted on 14 November 2001’ (20 
November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [4] & [5]. 
13 In contrast, these articles have received significant attention from WTO political representatives and from the 
academic community. For example, see WTO, ‘Communication from India – Clarifying TRIPS a Confidence-
Building Measure’ (6 October 2000) IP/C/W/214; WTO, ‘Minutes of Meeting held on 28-29 February 2012’ 
(15 May 2012) IP/C/M/69 [254]; Peter K Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2009) 
46 Houston L. Rev. 979; Edson Beas Rodrigues Jr., The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement: 
Promoting Sustainable Development (2012 CUP).  
14 WTO, Canada: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products – Report of the Panel (17 March 2000) 
WT/DS114/R (Canada – Pharmaceuticals). 
15 WTO, European Communities: Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs (15 March 2005) WT/DS174 & 290/R (EC – TMs & GIs). For a critique of the DSBs 
application of Articles 7 and/or 8 in these cases see, Slade (n 9) 353-357.  
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as merely illustrative of the inherent characteristics of the international intellectual property 
system, having little, if any, legal value in their own right. While, the decisions in Canada – 
Term of Protection16 and US – s211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 199817 suggest a more 
active role, most notably with Article 7 acting as ‘a form of the good faith principle,’ neither 
panel takes the opportunity to provide a detailed understanding. Consequently, the following 
analysis undertakes a dissection of the legislative language within Articles 7 and 8 in order to 
better realise their  meaning, relevance and application.  
As stressed by the WTO Appellate Body, ‘The fundamental rule of treaty interpretation 
requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the words actually used by the agreement 
under examination.’18 As discussed above, the ordinary meaning attributed to the words used 
must be made in light of a treaty’s context, and object and purpose. Yet, if we follow the 
VCLT principle of treaty interpretation the analysis becomes somewhat circular – Articles 7 
and 8 provide context, and object and purpose for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 
but it is necessary first to interpret these provisions before they can be utilised in that role. As 
observed by Buffard and Zemanek:  
[When interpreting ‘programmatic’ provisions of a treaty it is] evident that the 
process of interpretation prescribed by Article 31 para.1 of the VCLT can only be 
used with modification for that end. It is not possible to be guided in the 
interpretation of a treaty by its object and purpose when those have to be elucidated 
                                                
16 WTO, Canada: Term of Patent Protection – Report of the Appellate Body (18 September 2000) 
WT/DS170/AB/R. 
17 WTO, United States: Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 – Report of the Panel (6 August 2001) 
WT/DS176/R (US – s211). 
18 WTO, European Communities: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Report of the 
Appellate Body (16 January 1998) WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R [181] (emphasis added). 
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first by interpreting the treaty.19  
Yet, how are such provisions to be interpreted?  The VCLT is silent on how to establish the 
object and purpose of a treaty, or how to interpret provisions that seek to express such general 
intent.20 According to Sir Ian Sinclair, when seeking the object and purpose of a treaty ‘the 
text is the expression of the intention of the parties; and it is to that expression of intent that 
one must first look.’21 The following analysis will, therefore, be structured according to the 
individual textual elements expressed within Articles 7 and 8. Yet, Jan Klabbers cautions 
against using text alone to define a treaty’s object and purpose: 
[U]ndue reliance on the text alone may result in losing sight of the object and 
purpose of the treaty itself, and instead give rise to propositions relating to object 
and purpose of singular provisions or parts of provisions, thus resulting in a 
blunting of the analytical potential of the notion of object and purpose.22  
To avoid this interpretative trap, the analysis of the specific words and phrases will call upon 
other relevant materials to add authoritative meaning to the text. These sources include, inter 
alia, other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; subsequent agreements between the parties; 
the wider WTO legal system; and the policy foundations of intellectual property protection 
and the multilateral trading system. While having recourse to a wide range of supporting 
materials, the author recognises that ‘introducing obligations through the back door of object 
and purpose, after those have been refused entry through the front door’ should be avoided.23 
                                                
19 Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, ‘The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Aust. Rev. 
Int’l and Euro. L. 311, 333. See also, David S Jonas & Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose of a 
Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods’ (2010) 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 565, 581-582.  
20 Marco Slotboom, A Comparison of WTO and EC Law: Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty 
Interpretation? (Cameron May 2006) 53. 
21 Sinclair (n 8) 131. This approach reinforces the Article 31.1 emphasis on the text as the primary source of 
interpretative guidance.  
22 Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ (1997)  8 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 138, 157. 
23 Ibid 159.  
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This is especially so in light of Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) which makes it clear that the ‘Recommendations and Rulings of the DSB cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’24 Therefore, in 
order to balance this interpretative caution against the need to operationalise Articles 7 and 8, 
the analysis remains firmly grounded in the language actually used, and the supporting 
materials are those that can be sensibly rationalised in the international IP context.25 This is 
not to say that the following expresses the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement in its 
entirety; or that it is the definitive word on the interpretation and application of Articles 7 and 
8. It is accepted that defining the object and purpose of a treaty ‘in abstracto’ will rarely 
produce a conclusive result.26 Nevertheless, where directly expressed object and purpose 
exist, as with Articles 7 and 8,  the hope is that by conducting an detailed analyses of the 
individual textual elements greater analogies can be made with existing legal rules and 
principles.  This will augment existing academic writings to provide a meaningful insight into 
how these steering provisions can be given full effect by State Parties and those interpreting 
the TRIPS Agreement.27  
The replication of Articles 7 and 8 within the operative sections of other international 
and national intellectual property instruments underscores this growing need for a deeper 
understanding. The language of these provisions can now be found in the final text of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),28 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),29 the 
                                                
24 Understanding on the Rules Governing Disputes 1994 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 
1995) 1869 UNTS 40, art 3.2. 
25 Nevertheless, Jan Klabbers does note that indicators of object and purpose are wide ranging and in some cases 
even ‘intuition and common sense’ may provide useful guidance. Klabbers (n 21) 155.  
26 Klabbers (n 21) 160; Jonas & Saunders (n 18) 582. The authors note that the meaning of object and purpose 
depends not only on the treaty alone, but its application to a particular factual problem. 
27 Pedro Roffe (UNCTAD-ICTSD), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (CUP 2005) 119-127; Yu (n 6) 
982-992; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (4th edn, Thomson, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012) 227-241; Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patents and Test Data (4th edn, Wolters 
Kluwer 2014).  
28 Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Chapter 18, articles 18.2 and 18.3. https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text accessed 9 April 2016.  
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WIPO Development Agenda,30 and the amended Indian Patents Act 1970.31 It is clear that 
despite an apparent wane in the influence of the TRIPS Agreement, due to the proliferation of 
bi-lateral and regional agreements,32 these structural provisions (and the aims and concerns 
articulated therein) are independently acquiring an ever wider relevance.33 Reproducing these 
provisions advocates an enhanced legal and political status in both national and international 
IP norm setting for the objectives and principles contained therein.34 While it may be 
somewhat premature to suggest that these provisions are a customary part of the international 
IP system, their growing use evidently necessitates a more detailed understanding.  
 As will be demonstrated below, fundamentally Articles 7 and 8 require those interpreting 
the TRIPS Agreement to look at interests beyond those directly related to the acquisition and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.35 In this regard, these provisions reflect, at the 
international level, the balancing of interests that has consistently been undertaken at the 
national level.36 Given that Articles 7 and 8  acknowledge that intellectual property protection 
is inescapably aligned with other important national development objectives, it seems that,  
above all, they ought to reinforce national autonomy and, thus, deference to national policy 
choices.37 As articulated by Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘international 
[intellectual property] norms confine national policy choices, but they do not define 
                                                                                                                                                  
29 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Final Draft (May 2011), article 2.3.  https://ustr.gov/acta accessed 9 
April 2016. 
30 WIPO, ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda’(October 2007) 
Recommendation 45. http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html accessed 9 April 
2016. 
31 India – s83 Patents Act 1970.  
32 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Intellectual Property and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment’ in H. Ullrich, 
R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping and J Drexl, TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (Springer 2015).  
33 Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 164. 
34 Alison Slade, ‘Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: A Force for Convergence within the International IP 
System’ (2011) 14 JWIP 413. 
35 Jerzy Koopman, ‘Human Rights Implications of Patenting Biotechnological Knowledge’ in Paul L.C. 
Torresmans, Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2008) 546. 
36 Roffe (n 26) 119. 
37 TRIPS Agreement, art 1.1 states that ‘Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.’ See also WTO, 
India: Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products – Report of the Appellate Body (19 
December 1997) WTO/DS50/AB/R [59] (India – Pharmaceuticals). 
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them.’38 It is only at the national level that the competing economic and social interests 
reproduced in these provisions can be reconciled. In that regard, Article 7 and 8 would appear 
to allow each State significant room to self-determine appropriate levels of intellectual 
property protection. Accordingly, the following analysis articulates a prevailing principle of 
national regulatory authority (subject to the WTO requirements of consistency, necessity and 
reasonableness).39 This being the cardinal approach to effectively elucidating the objectives 
and principles of the TRIPS Agreement and to give them practical effect.  
 The observations made below will touch upon numerous topics, each provoking a 
myriad of issues and complexities, such as the precise interpretative impact on other 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement or the support these provisions provide for a human 
rights framework within the context of the WTO. However, the intention here is not to 
address each of these issues in turn, but to specifically analyse the meaning and scope  of the 
text of these provisions. It is only with a more comprehensive understanding of how Articles 
7 and 8 may be interpreted that many of these intricate and complex questions will be better 
addressed by the WTO, its Member States, and all those that adhere to other national and 
international agreements in which these provisions are incorporated.   
  
   
2. Article 7 - Objectives 
 
 Objective: - Of or pertaining to the object or end as the cause of action.40 
 
                                                
38 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 112. 
39 In April 2014, the Max-Planck Institute released a ‘Declaration on Patent Protection’. It forcefully asserted 
that ‘Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological 
capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities.’ Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition, ‘Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS’ 
(Munich, 15 April 2014) https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf  accessed 9 April 2016. 
40 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2nd edn, OUP 1989). 
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As the dictionary definition suggests, the fundamental rationale of the TRIPS Agreement is to 
realise the aims as expressed within Article 7.  For this reason Article 7 provides significant 
insight into that often posed question – what were the drafters’ intentions?41 It reminds us of 
the role that intellectual property rights play in incentivising creativity and innovation, yet 
alerts us to its detrimental side-effects. During negotiations many countries stressed the 
central role intellectual property protection plays in the process of innovation. Yet, many 
others, particularly developing countries, wished to recognise and also actively correct the 
negative impact that such protection may have on economic and social development.42 
Therefore, Article 7 requires a middle ground to be reached that optimises innovation, 
promotes social and economic development, while at the same time lessening the detrimental 
consequences of intellectual property protection.  
 Article 7 is certainly not a comprehensive expression of all the goals of the TRIPS 
Agreement.43 Nevertheless, it is the first attempt at defining the underlying rationale of a 
multilateral intellectual property instrument.44 In short, Article 7 invokes, at the international 
level, many of the implicit balancing principles that have historically been fundamental to 
national levels of intellectual property protection.45  Additionally, Article 7 unites these 
                                                
41 Yu (n 12) 1022. 
42 For an analysis of the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement see Duncan Matthews, Globalising 
Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPs Agreement (Routledge 2002) 29-45; Gervais (n 26) 3-31. 
43 The Preamble is considered to contain the ‘general goals’ of the TRIPS Agreement, predominant amongst 
which is recital 1. However, these ‘general goals’ should be read in conjunction with the objectives expressed in 
Article 7. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual 
Property Protection’ in Paul L C Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law 
International 2008) 173-175; Abdulqawi A Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’ in 
Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 
(Kluwer Law International 2008) 11; Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager and Jayashree Watal (eds), A Handbook 
on the WTO TRIPS Agreement (CUP 2012) 12-13. 
44 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 110. 
45 Ibid.  
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national principles with the broader objectives of the WTO as outlined in the recitals to the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.46 Michael Spence observes that: 
[L]ike the first recital to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, [Article 7] 
expresses a concern for increased global welfare. Similarly, like the second recital 
to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, it demonstrates a particular concern for 
developing countries which might be assumed to benefit most from the transfer 
and dissemination of technology.47 
Notwithstanding these comments, Spence draws attention to the difficulties inherent in a 
provision that promotes two highly contested functions of the intellectual property system – 
the promotion of innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology. He argues that 
this makes Article 7 an inadequate tool with which to identify and justify the intellectual 
property rights that ought to be included in the TRIPS Agreement.48 Could this be an 
underestimation of the drafters intended function(s) for Article 7? The provision is certainly 
concerned with validating the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, by assessing whether current 
intellectual property regimes can actually realise the stated objectives. However, in being the 
first provision within an international intellectual property instrument to articulate a set of 
guiding principles, Article 7 appears to be more widely concerned with the function and aims 
of the TRIPS Agreement within the legal systems of both the WTO and the individual 
Member States. It goes beyond providing an introduction to the scope of the Agreement, to 
prescribing a set of outcomes that are to guide the political and legal interpreters of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Hence, it seeks to achieve an optimal level of intellectual property 
protection aligned to distinct levels of economic and social development.  Crucially, the 
                                                
46 Michael Spence. ‘Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?’ in F. Francioni and M. Scovazzi 
(eds), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Hart 2001) 263, 265. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, 265-274.  
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appropriate standard of protection will be achieved when the objectives listed in Article 7 are 
attained at the national level.49  
Accordingly, it would be misguided to argue that the objectives expressed in Article 7 
require a rigid international optimisation of intellectual property standards. First, such an 
approach would misunderstand the nature of the TRIPS Agreement. It is an instrument which 
lays down a minimum set of intellectual property rules.50 For instance, there is nothing within 
the Agreement which prevents Members from adopting higher thresholds of protection if 
Members determine that such would be more conducive to achieving the objectives set out in 
Article 7.51 More importantly the TRIPS Agreement includes numerous ‘flexibilities’ that, if 
interpreted in accordance with Articles 7 and 8, provide sufficient elbow room for Member 
States to tailor their intellectual property regimes to reflect their own unique economic and 
social circumstances.52 Secondly, optimal levels of intellectual property protection have been 
notoriously difficult to determine, measure and achieve even at the national level.53 
Consequently, any attempt to attain international optimisation would be naively optimistic 
and necessarily involve complex calculations of economic and social welfare that would 
prove impossible to resolve. As will be shown below, an analysis of the terminology utilised 
within Article 7 supports the state-centric nature of the balancing of interests required.    
 
(a) The Terms of Article 7 
                                                
49 Wesley A Cann Jr, ‘On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-
Developed Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under A Theory of 
Progressive Global Constitutionalism’ (2004) 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 755, 808; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 
111.  
50 Roffe (n 26) 35. 
51 Article 1.1 states that, ‘Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by the Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions 
of this Agreement.’  
52 WIPO, ‘Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement’, http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html  accessed 9 April 2016.   
53 Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Institute for International Economics, 
2000) 28.  
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(i) ‘The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights...’ 
 
The opening phrase of this provision makes clear that the application of Article 7 extends not 
only to the scope and nature of the rights granted, but also to the enforcement measures 
covered by the TRIPS Agreement. More expansively, the focus of the provision is the 
broader impact of ‘intellectual property rights’, and not merely as a tool to reconcile one 
provision of TRIPS with another. This has led Peter Yu to conclude that: - 
[Article 7] therefore anticipates further balancing within the larger international 
trading system. As the WTO Panel declared in United States – Section 110(5) of 
the U.S. Copyright Act, “the agreements covered by the WTO form a single, 
integrated legal system.” Because “[t]he proper balance of rights and obligations 
is an overriding objective of the WTO system,” the objectives and principles of 
the TRIPS Agreement need to be considered in relation to this particular 
objective.54  
 
Therefore, the objectives contained within Article 7 need to be explored not merely within 
the discrete application of the TRIPS Agreement but within the wider context of the WTO 
trading system. Viewed as a whole, the WTO structure regards an optimised trading system 
as one that acknowledges a wider purpose. As stated in the opening recital to Agreement 
Establishing the World Trading Organisation: - 
Parties to this Agreement recogniz[e] that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect 
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development.55 
                                                
54 Yu (n 12) 1007 -1008 (citations omitted). 
55  (adopted 14 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 154. 
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Recital 2 goes further in recognising that positive action needs to be taken to ensure that 
developing and least developed nations ‘secure a share in the growth of international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development’. The Appellate Body has 
confirmed the unified framework and ‘single undertaking’ nature of the WTO Agreement,56 
thereby making the WTO’s development objectives applicable to all its Annexes, including 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
 Bearing in mind that intellectual property protection creates legal rights with 
monopolistic tendencies, it would be right to assume that the characterisation and scope of 
the rights involved should be determined in light of the public interest criteria mentioned 
above. Particular consideration should be given to the level of social and economic 
development of each State Party and any circumstances that requires the moderation of 
recognised rights. Any failure in this regard could undermine the legitimacy of international 
intellectual property regimes including TRIPS, the WTO and the multilateral trading system 
that it aims to facilitate.57  
 
(ii) ‘should contribute to...’ 
 
This phrase marks Article 7 as a provision which contains the primary aims or goals of the 
Agreement. The assumption is that upon implementation Member States should seek to 
                                                
56 WTO, Brazil: Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut-Report of the Appellate Body (21 February 1997) 
WT/DS22/AB/R, 13-14.  
57 Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the 
Public Domain of Science under International Law’ in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman (eds), 
International Public Goods and the Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 
(CUP, 2005) 883. 
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realize all the objectives contained within Article 7. Hence, this provision expresses standards 
expected of a successfully functioning intellectual property regime.  
  Much has been made about Article 7 being a ‘should’ provision rather than a ‘shall’ 
provision.58 The argument maintains that the word ‘shall’ places a mandatory obligation on 
the parties to an agreement, yet the use of ‘should’ indicates a lesser obligation that only 
encourages parties to achieve the stated aims. This latter approach regards Article 7 as merely 
hortatory or aspirational in nature.59 If we accept this distinction, then as a substantive 
provision the Article 7 objectives will always be superseded by ‘shall’ provisions or their 
equivalent.  
 However, it is generally accepted that the value of Article 7 rests in its ability to steer the 
interpretation of these ‘shall’ provisions and not to form the content of a substantive 
obligation.60 If this is the case then the distinction appears to be irrelevant. It is not then a 
case of weighing discrete substantive provisions, but of interpreting the substantive 
provisions. The ‘should’ provision then adopts the role of determining what ‘shall’ be 
achieved. As observed by Pedro Roffe, in the  UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS 
and Development, ‘[C]ountries should frame the applicable rules so as to promote 
technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology “in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare.”’61 The ‘should’ in this instance recognises that 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights does not always result in the 
various outcomes listed in Article 7, but that it ‘should’ do so.62 In fact, in some instances the 
                                                
58 Correa (n 5) 93; Yu (n 12) 1003; Gervais (n 26) 230. 
59 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?’ (2004) 71 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 
21, 22; Margaret Chon, ‘Intellectual Property and the Development Divide’ (2006) 27 Cardoza L. Rev. 2821, 
2843. 
60 Correa (n 5) 93; Gervais (n 26) 239; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 110. 
61 Roffe (n 26) 126 (emphasis added). 
62 Correa (n 5) 95. 
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protection of intellectual property rights will not encourage creative output63 and can even 
stifle the innovation that it aims to promote. Consequently, Article 7 carries an interpretative 
function that directs the application of the Agreement to achieve the stated objectives. This 
makes the word ‘should’ central to the whole provision. Therefore, the ‘should’ in Article 7 
indicates an obligation, the nature of which is interpretative rather than substantive.  
  The phrase ‘contribute to’ is also of note in the provision. Throughout the negotiation of 
the TRIPS Agreement the protection of intellectual property rights was often promoted as a 
panacea for many of the social and economic problems facing developing countries. In short, 
by implementing higher standards of national intellectual property protection, States would 
encourage corporations to transfer their products or services to the protecting state and even 
work them locally. This would lead to the transfer of technology to these nations, thereby 
advancing economic expansion and thus resulting in high standards of living and social 
development. Yet the expression ‘contribute to’ confirms that intellectual property protection 
can never be such a panacea. It can only be one of many factors that operate together to 
promote innovation and the dissemination of information and technology.64 In this regard, 
Article 7 acknowledges the linkages that exist between intellectual property and other factors 
of development and requires that such protection is sympathetic to a State’s level of social 
and economic development.65  
 
(iii) ‘the promotion of technological innovation...’ 
 
                                                
63 Carlos A Primo Braga, Carsten Fink and Claudia Paz Sepulveda, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development’ (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412, March 2000) 27-31 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/05/13/000094946_00050206013672/Rendered/
PDF/multi_page.pdf   accessed 9 April 2016; Correa (n 5) 96-97. 
64 Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 181-182. 
65 Ibid, 100.  
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A primary justification for the intellectual property system is the incentive it provides for 
advancement in many fields. The introduction of the TRIPS Agreement extends that stimulus 
beyond national boundaries. The claim that intellectual property protection can promote 
innovation is premised upon the notion that protectable subject matter is a ‘public good’. 
Innovation, unlike real property, is non-exhaustible. Once produced it can be utilised 
extensively without depleting the social value of the original.66 While this in itself is not 
especially problematic, the difficulties arise when the creator wishes to exclude others from 
its utilisation once the subject matter has been disclosed to the public. The new development 
or creation can often be reproduced with little cost or effort on the part of others, thus 
removing or severely limiting the market for the original product or process. By granting a set 
of exclusive rights, for a set period of time, rights holders are able to exclude others from 
commercially exploiting the protected subject matter. This enhances the opportunity to 
recoup the expenditure incurred in developing the product or service and increases the 
prospect of additional financial rewards by securing the market for the rights holder. 
Accordingly, in light of intellectual property protection, an individual or corporation can 
create and exploit the manifestation of their efforts secure in the knowledge that a competitor 
cannot ‘free-ride’ at their expense. This rationale behind intellectual property protection is 
often difficult to reconcile with those of free trade and its underlying philosophies – the 
former being ‘protectionist’ and the latter being ‘pro-competitive.’67 Yet, it does reflect the 
view that intellectual property protection aims to serve the broader interests of society 
through the encouragement of innovation and creation, and the transfer of that knowledge to 
others.68 This latter point will be considered in more detail below.  
                                                
66 William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard 
University Press 2003) 11-25; Matthew Fisher, ‘Classical Economics and Philosophy of the Patent System’ 
(2005) IPQ 1, 4-5. 
67 Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade, 4th edn 
(Routledge 2013) 518. 
68 Rodrigues (n 12) 44. 
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  An important distinction has been made between the use of the term ‘technical 
innovation’ over that of ‘technical invention’.69 The former is taken to refer to a fully 
functioning and marketable product that may take the form of an inventive and completely 
self-supporting product or process, or it may be an existing product or process that includes a 
newly inventive component. By contrast, the term invention is understood to characterize the 
early implementation of the new idea or concept itself, i.e. a model or prototype.70  Thus, the 
TRIPS Agreement suggests that the intellectual property regime it defines is not merely 
concerned with incentivising creativity or inventiveness at its earliest stages, but with 
incentivising the production of new products or processes that can demonstrate some 
practical application and/or trading capability. Prima facie, this appears to run counter to the 
substantive rules of many national intellectual property systems, in particular patent law.  
 While patent law requires that a protectable invention demonstrate some utility,71 it is 
recognised that in many jurisdictions this is not an onerous prerequisite to patent grant.72 As 
long as the invention is capable73 of some use in industry or agriculture, it is not necessary to 
provide evidence of actual operation in such a setting.74 However, as mentioned above, 
Article 7 does not directly prescribe any substantive rules. Rather, it imposes a set of 
optimised outcomes. Innovation, as a useful end-product, yields the greatest benefits for 
                                                
69 Robert P Merges, ‘Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation’ (1988) 
76 Calif. L. Rev. 805, 807; Jan Fagerber, ‘Innovation: A Guide to the Literature’ in Jan Fagerber, David C 
Mowery and Richard R Nelson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (OUP 2005) 4-8. 
70 Merges (n 68) 807. 
71 For a detailed analysis of the application of the utility requirement between states see Christopher Wadlow, 
‘Utility and Industrial Applicability’ in Toshiko Takenaka (ed), Patent Law and Theory: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2008) 355; Jay Erstling, Amy M Salmela & Justin N Woo, ‘Usefulness 
Varies by Country: The Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, Europe and Canada’ (2012) 3 
CYBARIS 1.   
72 European Patent Convention, art 57 requires that ‘An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial 
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.’ For example, the UK 
Supreme Court has accepted that in the context of the biotech industry it was in some cases sufficient to 
demonstrate that industrial application was simply ‘plausible’. Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly and Co. 
[2011] UKSC 51 [122]. See also a discussion of the ‘weak’ utility requirement in US law in E Richard Gold & 
Michael Shortt, ‘The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World’ (2014) 30 CIPR 1, 31-37. 
73 TRIPS Agreement, art 27.1.  
74 The utility requirement within Canadian patent law has been defined as ‘a representation contained in a patent 
specification, whether implicit or explicit, that the patented invention will achieve one or more desirable, or will 
avoid one or more undesirable outcomes.’ Gold & Shortt (n 71) 3 (emphasis added). 
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society and it is this that underscores the Article 7 objective. Invention without application, 
while intellectually meritorious, is economically ineffective, as it does not provide the 
necessary financial incentives for further advancement. Yet, to impose too high a threshold of 
utility or industrial application could undermine the production of innovation. Although 
patent law sets a low threshold for industrial application it does so on the basis that too 
onerous a standard could undermine the next stated objective of the TRIPS Agreement, 
namely, dissemination. The granting of patents at the earlier stage of the innovation process 
encourages disclosure of the invention and thereby their subsequent utilisation in the ultimate 
quest for functional results.75  
  Nevertheless, the claim that intellectual property protection can promote innovation is 
highly contested.76 It has been noted that levels of intellectual property protection, as applied 
in the developed nations, is not likely to promote innovation in countries which do not have 
the necessary infrastructure and capabilities to support such activities.77 In fact, by virtue of 
their monopolistic tendencies intellectual property rights can actually operate to suppress 
innovation in both developing and developed countries.78 In this context Article 7 operates to 
facilitate an equilibrium between the incentivisation capacity of the intellectual property 
system and the negative impacts of monopolistic rights.79  
                                                
75 Thus, many jurisdictions use the requirement of ‘sufficient disclosure’ or ‘enablement’ to indirectly 
supplement a weaker utility requirement, thereby simultaneously providing a safeguard against the patenting of 
inventions that lack utility and ensuring effective dissemination of the underlying knowledge. Gold & Shortt (n 
71) 31-37.   
76 For an analysis of research in this area see Edwin Mansfield, ‘Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study’ 
(1986) 32 Management Science 173; Adam B Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents: How Our 
Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to do About it’, (Princeton University 
Press 2004); Josh Lerner, ‘150 Years of Patent Protection’ in Robert P Merges (ed), Economics of Intellectual 
Property Law (Edward Elgar 2007). 
77 Roffe (n 26) 126. 
78 The way in which IP protection operates to promote or suppress innovation is complex and is dependant upon 
many factors such as the strength and extent of protection; the nature of the product being protected; and the 
maturity of the relevant industry. Spence (n 45) 266-271; Jaffe and Lerner (n 75) Chapter 2. 
79 William D Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 
(M.I.T. Press 1969) 76. 
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  One further point that must be made is the curious limitation to certain types of subject 
matter – technological innovation. Interestingly, a broad definition of ‘innovation’, denoting 
‘the introduction of novelties or the alteration of what is established by the introduction of 
new elements or forms,’80 is wide enough to encompass all forms of creative activity, i.e. 
cultural, commercial or technological. Does this mean that Article 7 only has application 
when certain types of intellectual property are involved, i.e. patents, the layout designs of 
integrated circuits, certain trade secrets, and copyright when protecting technical creations 
such as software?81 This question is especially pertinent given that the reference to 
‘technology’ is also repeated in other phrases within Article 7. 
 Correa writes that the terminology adopted may not signal a deliberate limitation by 
those negotiating the Agreement. In fact, it may have been a mere oversight on the part of the 
developing countries who, during negotiations, were preoccupied with the impact the 
protection of technology related innovation would have upon access to certain products and 
services.82 This reasoning is supported by paragraph 19 of the 2001 Ministerial Declaration.83 
This paragraph requires that the objectives and principles, as set out in Articles 7 and 8, guide 
the Council for TRIPS when examining the relationship between intellectual property and 
non-technical subject matter including traditional knowledge and folklore; and subject matter 
covered by the Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is no doubt that patent law is 
an important consideration in these relationships, other non-technical elements of intellectual 
property law, such as copyright, are also of relevance and are to be guided by the terms of 
Article 7. Furthermore, the latter objectives of Article 7 seemingly refer to all intellectual 
property rights within the TRIPS Agreement, requiring them to be applied in a ‘manner 
                                                
80 OED (n 39). 
81 Correa (n 5) 92. 
82 Ibid. 
83 WTO, ‘Ministerial Declaration – Adopted on 14 November 2001’ (20 November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
[19]. 
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conducive to social and economic welfare’ and in a way that achieves ‘a balance of rights and 
obligations.’84  
  Complications would also arise if Article 7 was deemed to have application for only 
technological innovation, as it would require a definition to be attributed to ‘technology’ for 
the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. As documented by commentators and the courts, this 
approach is fraught with difficulties. Justine Pila observes that: - 
[T]he term “technology”, which, and as social theorists have again recognized, is 
too opaque and elastic to be informative. Indeed, philosophers of technology have 
noted the “bewildering variety of ways of understanding the word 
‘technology”’, and the difficulty of formulating a conception that is “neither so 
general that it risks vacuity by fitting every conceivable case, nor so specialized 
that it captures only a tiny range of the phenomena to be explained.”85  
 
  However, one cannot ignore the possibility that the intention was to limit the application 
of Article 7 only to protectable technology.  Yet this in no way diminishes importance of 
Article 7 as a structural provision for guiding those tasked with interpreting the substantive 
content of the treaty’s provisions. It only refines its scope.   
 
(iv) ‘and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,...’ 
 
Another primary justification for intellectual property protection is the value it holds for the 
dissemination of knowledge and the transfer of technology both nationally and 
internationally. The utility of the intellectual property system rests not merely in protecting 
the interests of the rights holder, but in doing so for the wider public interest. The protection 
                                                
84 Denis Borges Barbosa, ‘TRIPs art. 7 and 8, FTAs and Trademarks’ (2006) 6. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889107 accessed 9 April 2016; Yu (n 12) 1000. 
85 Justine Pila, ‘On the European Requirement for an Invention’ (2010) 41 IIC 906, 918 (citations omitted). 
Justice Phelan of the Federal Court of Canada observes that to introduce a technology test ‘would be highly 
subjective and provide little predictability. Technology is in such a state of flux that to attempt to define it would 
serve to defeat the flexibility which is so crucial to the Act.’ Amazon.com Inc v The Attorney General of Canada 
and the Commissioner of Patents [2010] 86 C.P.R. (4th) 321 [71]. 
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of intellectual property is often premised upon social contract theories: society grants the 
inventor or creator a selection of exclusive rights and in return the inventor or creator grants 
full disclosure – the ‘intellectual property bargain.’86 Thus, the system is of wider interest to 
society who are now free to use that knowledge and information (albeit, subject to the 
requisite licensing arrangements). This in turn fosters further innovation, creation and 
improvement.  
  A distinction must be drawn between transfer and dissemination. While these two 
concepts are similar in their objectives – widening access to information – the transfer of 
technology has a greater connection with access to information through industry. Effective 
intellectual property protection reassures rights holders that their intellectual assets will be 
protected and thereby encourages a willingness to transfer valuable knowledge to others 
through, for example, licensing agreements and training programmes that see the rights 
holder and the recipient working in partnership.87 Whereas, ‘dissemination’ appears to refer 
to both the informal mechanisms of information dispersal, such as internet transmission,88 
and the formal disclosure requirements of the intellectual property system itself, such as the 
‘sufficiency’ requirement of patent law.89  
  It is well documented that the promise of international technology transfer in return for 
stronger intellectual property standards was a key incentive for developing countries in 
accepting the incorporation of intellectual property regulation within the framework of the 
WTO. 90 Here Article 7 expressly integrates this objective within the text of the Agreement 
itself. This provision together with Articles 8.2 and 66.2 create a reciprocal obligation for 
                                                
86 Fisher (n 65) 20-24. 
87 Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 184-191.  
88 Correa (n 5) 99; Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 189-191. 
89 TRIPS Agreement, art 29.1.  
90 See, for example, Carlos M Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries? In Keith E Maskus & Jerome H Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (CUP 2005) 227. 
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developed nations to actively facilitate technology transfer, particularly to those nations in 
need of assistance in generating a ‘sound and viable technological base.’91  
  However, once again the narrower understanding of Article 7, in promoting the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, may impact upon the scope of the provision. Nevertheless, 
the transfer and dissemination of protected subject matter which is not technological in nature 
may in fact lead to the transfer and dissemination of associated technological information and 
know-how via foreign direct investment in local production.92 As observed by Michael 
Spence, if a developing country provides strong copyright protection for the creative arts, 
such as film production or literary publishing, a foreign organisation may be willing to set up 
an operation in that country bringing with them the technological information and know-how 
of the industry.93 In addition, the transfer and dissemination of protected technological 
subject matter may be dependant on adequate intellectual property protection for associated 
non-technological material, such as trade marks.94 An organisation may be unwilling to 
licence patented technology without being secure in the knowledge that their marketing assets 
will also be adequately protected.  
  In summary, the inclusion of ‘the transfer and dissemination of technology’ in Article 7 
seeks to remind those implementing and interpreting the Agreement that the principal 
objective of incentivisation cannot be understood in isolation from the equally important 
objective of dissemination. The diffusion of knowledge and information sought must also be 
understood to emanate from both formal and informal channels of communication. To ignore 
or subvert this objective would disturb the overriding public interest objectives of the whole 
intellectual property system. 
                                                
91 WTO, ‘Implementation of Article 66.2, of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 19 
February 2003’ (20 February 2003) IP/C/28 [1]; WTO, ‘Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns: Decision 
of 14 November 2001’ (20 November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/17 [11.2]. 
92 Spence (n 45) 272. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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(v) ‘to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge...’ 
 
This objective seeks to refocus the nature of the Agreement. Whilst the Preamble states that 
an objective of the TRIPS Agreement is the ‘effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights,’95 this objective in Article 7 aims to reaffirm that higher standards of 
intellectual property protection are not an end in themselves.96 Historical justifications for 
intellectual property protection regard the protection of rights holders’ interests as a means to 
an end.  That end being the wider interest of the public in having access to innovative 
technological and cultural products.97 As discussed, intellectual property policy grants rights 
of exclusion in return for the adequate disclosure of the protected work.  
  In addition, this language in Article 7 draws a parallel with the substantive sections of 
the TRIPS Agreement. Here Article 7 is concerned with user access which is chiefly reflected 
in the ‘exception’ provisions, such as Article 13 (copyright), Article 17 (trade marks), and 
Article 30 (patents). Correa observes that ‘users’ in this context can be taken to mean both the 
consumers of end products and producers wishing to use the protected subject matter in their 
own production processes.98 Therefore, not only does the TRIPS Agreement provide 
protection for producers of technological and cultural products, it also provides for the rights 
of the users of such products. Furthermore, ‘users’ of technological innovation could refer to 
many developing countries themselves. As net importers of protected technologies they are 
‘largely users of technologies produced abroad.’99 This means that the requirement of 
                                                
95 TRIPS Agreement, preamble, recital 1.  
96 Roffe (n 26) 125. 
97 Edwin C Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, 36. 
98 Correa (n 5) 99. 
99 Roffe (n 26) 126. 
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‘mutual advantage’ applies not only between producers and direct consumers, but also 
between producers and the broader interests of a developing state.  
  Having acknowledged that the TRIPS Agreement covers a range of competing interests, 
Article 7 rather obscurely identifies how those interests are to relate to one another. The 
Agreement is to be interpreted and applied ‘to the mutual advantage of producers and users’. 
Clearly the intention is to find a balance between the various interests that is equally 
advantageous to both producers and users.100 Producers will wish to be guaranteed a 
sufficient period of exclusive protection to allow them to recoup their investment. Users will 
wish to gain access to the product as soon as possible to further their business or research. In 
the case of governments, they will wish to enhance the public interest as appropriate to their 
level of development. The balance to be drawn in a fine one and can be difficult to articulate. 
To overprotect creative and innovative products risks stifling further innovation and delays 
the entry of competition into the marketplace. Yet, a policy that too readily favours users’ 
access can weaken the incentive effect of intellectual property protection, and reduce 
innovative and creative output. Further, it could result in creative or technological 
advancements being protected by alternative legal means that do not directly facilitate the 
dissemination of information, i.e. trade secret law.101  
 The challenges to identifying the appropriate balance are polarised when intellectual 
property protection stands in the way of achieving important social welfare objectives. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to try to over-clarify the balance required. Over-clarification 
can result in rigidity in application and absurdity in outcomes. National development 
objectives as well as specific factual situations vary greatly. For example, patent protection is 
often promoted as vital for R&D in the pharmaceutical industry, which requires a period of 
                                                
100 Yu (n 12) 1007. 
101 Gervais (n 26) 232. 
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exclusivity to recoup their substantial investment.102 However, the effect on those that require 
access to a particular drug is a question of degree and varies between states. In some 
instances the result is expensive, yet still accessible, healthcare medication, in others, 
individuals and  governments are unable to purchase the necessary medication leading to 
debilitating and often catastrophic results.103 Hence, national regulatory determinations in 
accordance with the level of social and economic development are to be respected when 
within the boundaries of international legal requirements.  
  
(vi) ‘and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,...’ 
 
This phrase has been held to signify that ‘the recognition and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights are subject to higher social values.’104 The protection of intellectual property, 
predominantly influenced by utilitarianism,105 can never mean that all aspects of intellectual 
property protection will always be conducive to social and economic welfare. The rights that 
are granted by governments and legislature can and sometimes do have negative 
consequences, including the entrenchment of monopolistic practices that run counter to 
elementary economic policy. However, this is regarded as a ‘necessary evil’106 that must be 
tolerated to bring about greater economic and social benefits. The granting of exclusive rights 
                                                
102 See, for example, Harvey E Bale Jr, ‘Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (1996) 29 NYUJ 
Int’L & Pol. 95; Henry Grabowski, ‘Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 5 JIEL 
849. For a contrary perspective see Yi Qian, ‘Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a 
Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 1978-2002’ 
(2007) 89 Review of Economics and Statistics 436.  
103 See generally, Ellen F M ‘T Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: 
Seattle, Doha and Beyond’ (2003)  http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/tHoen.pdf  accessed 9 
April 2016. Whilst patents influence access to pharmaceuticals, it is important not to overemphasise its impact. 
Bryan C Mercurio, ‘Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and Barriers of 
Access to Essential Medicines’ (2006) 5 NW. Univ. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1. 
104 Correa (n 5) 99. 
105 Maskus (n 52) 28; Landes & Posner (n 65) 11-36; Ruse-Khan (n 42) 174. 
106 The ‘evil’ of monopoly markets is however extensively regulated in most states by extensive competition law 
and from within IP regimes themselves.  
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incentivises further creation, innovation and improvement which are seen as desirable. The 
predominant objective is to achieve a balance between the problems that the scarcity of 
production creates with the benefits that intellectual property protection brings for 
encouraging creation.   
 
(vii) ‘and to a balance of rights and obligations.’ 
 
The inclusion of this phrase confirms that intellectual property protection does not exist in a 
vacuum. Once again the emphasis is on recognising that protecting intellectual property 
rights is not the end objective,107 but is to be balanced against other obligations arising both 
within the TRIPS Agreement and beyond.  
Accordingly, Member States when implementing their obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement must ensure that they do so in a manner that obtains the correct balance. When it 
comes to procedural obligations, the TRIPS Agreement provides some limited guidance as to 
what the correct balance between rights and obligations is to be. For example, Article 29 
places a condition of disclosure on the grant of patents. However, beyond this procedural 
guidance, there is no definitive indication of what the correct substantive balance might be. 
We can look to other expressions within Article 7 which promote innovation, technology 
transfer and dissemination, and social and economic welfare, but again these merely establish 
a desired outcome without clear guidance for the obtaining the correct balance of rights and 
obligations.  
That being said, it is possible to draw some guidance from the rest of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The individual subject matter sections of the TRIPS Agreement establish the 
                                                
107 Correa (n 5) 101. 
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nature of the rights that are to be granted. In turn, in each of the subject matter sections 
Members may provide for exceptions to the rights conferred. These exceptions are clearly 
meant to integrate obligations that arise to others, and that the Member State deems to be 
relevant for both economic and social welfare.108 The exceptions to the substantive rights are 
generally cast in rather ambiguous terms, not making the relationship between the rights and 
exceptions particularly clear. Yet it is here that Article 7 may take on its most informative 
role. In interpreting the exceptions in the Agreement and their relationship with the rights 
granted, all the terms within Article 7 can work to guide the interpreter on how to achieve the 
correct balance of rights and obligations. The exceptions to the Agreement are the 
instruments through which the objectives contained within Article 7 are realised.109 The 
interpretative function of Article 7 is supplemented by the same function in relation to Article 
8 and by other provisions of the Agreement that seek to control the rights of the intellectual 
property owner, such as those relating to anti-competitive practices.110  
  Article 7 has broader application beyond balancing the rights and obligations that arise 
under the TRIPS Agreement itself. Concerns that arise in relation to rights and obligations 
occurring outside of the intellectual property and trade arena need to be observed as part of 
the application of Article 7. As noted by Cottier and Véron, an example of this broader 
balancing is expressed in Article 16.5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This 
requires cooperation between contracting parties to ensure that patents and other intellectual 
property rights ‘are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives,’ while achieving 
compliance with national and international laws in the area.111 
                                                
108 TRIPS Agreement, arts 13, 17, 24.4-24.9, 26.2, 27.2, 30 & 31.  
109 Sisule F Musungu, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, 
Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International 2008) 434.  
110 TRIPS Agreement, arts 31(k) & 40. 
111 Thomas Cottier and Pierre Véron, Concise International and European IP Law: TRIPS, Paris Convention, 
European Enforcement and Transfer of Technology (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 31. 
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  Notably, the decision of the Panel in US – s211112 provides significant insight into what 
it means for states to achieve a ‘balance of rights and obligations.’ The Panel observed that:  
 
[A]rticle 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states that one of the objectives is that “the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute…to a 
balance of rights and obligations.” We consider this expression to be a form of the 
good faith principle…One application of this principle, the doctrine widely known 
as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s right.  
 
In a previous paper, I have argued that this statement may lead Article 7 to be recognised as 
an effective source of legal obligations within the TRIPS Agreement, invoking both 
interpretative and substantive commitments under the principle of good faith.113 This is a 
significant development. It assimilates into the TRIPS Agreement legal concepts that are not 
explicit within the text, and expressly recognises Article 7 as their source. For example, by 
analysing the jurisprudence of the WTO it is possible to identify several good faith 
corollaries, such as pacta sunt servanda and the principles of effectiveness and legitimate 
expectations.114 These place obligations on all Member States when implementing the 
Agreement, and the judicial bodies when interpreting it.115 In addition, the doctrine of abus 
de droit, as a derivative of the good faith principle, may give rise to substantive obligations, 
even though such obligations are again not expressly acknowledged within the text of the 
Agreement. Consequently, by connecting Article 7 with the principle of good faith, the panel, 
in US- s211, legally obliges Member States and those interpreting the Agreement to conduct 
                                                
112 (n 16) 
113 For a detailed analysis of the implications of the Panel’s decision in US – s211 see Slade (n 9). 
114 The principle of legitimate expectations within the context of the TRIPS Agreement, has been limited to non-
violation complaints which are currently expressly excluded. India – Pharmaceuticals (n 36) 36-42. A 
moratorium against non-violation complaints is currently maintained in accordance with articles 64.2 and 64.3 
TRIPS Agreement. 
115 Slade (n 9).  
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‘a balancing of rights and obligations.’ This increases significantly the relevance of this 
provision and its future application.  
  However, it must be emphasised that Article 7 is not a tool for eroding the rights granted 
under the TRIPS Agreement, but for controlling those rights in a way that facilitates 
achieving the other objectives expressed in Article 7. As noted by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss: - 
[Article 7’s] endorsement of the goal of promoting technological innovation and 
achieving the “mutual advantage of producers and users” equally safeguards right 
holder’s interests in effective protection. Thus, a member state might challenge a 
provision that undermines the innovative environment on the ground that it shifts 
the balance too far in favor of users. Article 7 is, in short, not a commitment to 
any particular vision of intellectual property.116 
 
Nevertheless, as noted above, it is a commitment to national autonomy: - 
[Article 7] is a structural commitment that helps define the parameters in which 
members states can make different intellectual property choices appropriate to 
their needs.117 
 
 
(b) Summary 
 
Article 7 articulates the objectives of the intellectual property system that have up to this 
point been implicit within both national and international systems. Their express inclusion 
within the TRIPS Agreement therefore provides significant insight into the intentions of the 
drafters of the Agreement. As recognised by Pedro Roffe: - 
In litigation concerning intellectual property rights, courts commonly seek the 
underlying objectives of the national legislator, asking the purpose behind 
establishing a particular right. Article 7 makes clear that TRIPS negotiators did 
                                                
116 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 111. 
117 Ibid. See also Antony Taubman, A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS (OUP 2011) 17. 
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not intend to abandon a balanced perspective on the role of intellectual property 
rights in society.118 
 
The clear intention is to position intellectual property within the context of not only the WTO 
trading system but also the wider context of national development. Article 7 ensures that the 
objectives as stated are not forgotten or ignored in the push for internationally liberalised 
trade.  
  As a set of interpretative principles they permit and arguably require legislative and legal 
interpreters to target national intellectual property laws towards achieving the stated 
outcomes. They logically facilitate domestic flexibility over intellectual property strategy. 119 
Although Article 7 does not give authority to renegotiate the terms of the TRIPS 
Agreement,120 it does authorise a degree of variation between Member States to 
accommodate other national and international policies.  In its role towards promoting 
innovation, dissemination, social and economic welfare and a balance of rights and 
obligations, Article 7 displays an equal responsibility towards the protection of intellectual 
property rights and the wider economic and social impact. That responsibility would appear 
to be one that may carry with it legal consequences in the form of the principle of good faith.  
 
3. Article 8 - Principles 
 
Principle: - A fundamental truth or proposition, on which many others depend; a 
primary truth comprehending or forming the basis of, various subordinate truths; 
a general statement or tenet forming the (or a ) ground of, or held to be essential 
to, a system of thought or belief; a fundamental assumption forming the basis of a 
chain of reasoning.121 
 
                                                
118 Roffe (n 26) 126. 
119 Yusuf (n 42) 13. 
120 Canada – Pharmaceuticals (n 13) [7.25]. 
121 OED (n 39). 
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The dictionary definition of ‘principle’ seeks to emphasise the foundational nature of the 
proposition being advanced. It makes clear that a principle is to be regarded as the 
motivational force behind the line of thought or the course of action being championed. In 
this regard, Article 8 is complementary to Article 7 in that it underlines the motive and 
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, if we take this understanding of principle and 
place it into the context of a legal agreement we can see that the more general understanding 
can now be refined into that of a legal norm.   
Legal principles are recognized as ‘general, basic or underlying assumptions or precepts 
[that] embody fundamental regulatory purposes or values and provide a broad guide for the 
development of legal rules.’122 Hence, they are distinct from legal rules, which lay down a 
series of explicit rights and obligations that are ‘applicable in an all or nothing fashion.’123 As 
highlighted in the dictionary definition above, principles articulate the fundamental basis or 
truth of any legal system.124 In that regard, we can isolate two functions for legal principles. 
First, they encompass legal concepts that guide the application of the relevant rules. 
Secondly, they validate, justify and thus legitimise the scope of any legal regime. To ignore 
legal principles ‘implies offence not only to a specific command, but to the whole system of 
commands.’125 
 As a guide to the application of legal rules, principles step in to fill the textual gaps that 
are an inevitable reality of any legal system. It is impossible to provide explicit guidance for 
every eventuality that might be encompassed by its rules.126 This is especially so in the 
                                                
122 Andrew D Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (CUP 2008) 7. 
123 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Gerald Duckworth 1977) 24.  
124 For a detailed discussion on the distinction between rules and principles please refer to the renowned works 
of Ronald Dworkin (n 122) in particular 22-45; In a response to Dworkin see, Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Principles and 
the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 823; John Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal 
Certainty’ (2002) 27 Aust. J. Leg. Phil. 47; Mitchell (n 121) 7-23. 
125 Rodrigues (n 6) 44, quoting Celso Antonio Bandeira de Mello, Curso de direito administrative, 17th ed 
(Malheiros 2004) 841-842. 
126 Mitchell (n 121) 2. 
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international arena where the inherent difficulties in reaching agreement on often complex 
subject matter leads to ambiguity or even silence in relation to many of the rights and 
obligations included.127 Hence, the most significant role for legal principles rests in providing 
more or less broadly defined guidance for identifying the correct interpretation to be 
attributed to an ambiguous rule.  
 The TRIPS Agreement consists of both principles as well as rules. In the preamble to the 
TRIPS Agreement Members recognise ‘the need for new rules and disciplines concerning the 
provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of 
trade-related intellectual property rights’ and ‘the need for a multilateral framework of 
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods.’128 
These principles exist in addition to the structural principles that traverse all WTO treaties, 
such as trade liberalisation, non-discrimination and special and differential treatment.129 
Therefore, it would appear fortunate for the process of treaty interpretation that, in 
addition to the substantive rules of the Agreement, Members took steps to define a set of 
‘principles’ within the operative section of the text. These principles are to apply when a 
Member State chooses to adopt measures pursuant to the objectives expressed within Article 
8. This approach would mirror that adopted in relation to other provisions within other WTO 
Agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For example, 
Article XXXVI of the GATT, entitled ‘Principles and Objectives’ has been held out as 
containing horizontally applicable principles. Notably, paragraph 8 expresses the principle of 
                                                
127 Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across 
International Tribunals’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff & Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (CUP 2012) 447.  
128 TRIPS Agreement, Preamble, recitals 2(b) and 3 (emphasis added). 
129 Meinhard Hilf, ‘Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?’ (2001) 4 J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 111, 117-121.  
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non-reciprocity130 and, as stated in the explanatory notes, ‘This paragraph would apply in the 
event of action under Section A of Article XVIII, Article XXVIII, Article 
XXVIII bis,... Article XXXIII, or any other procedure under this Agreement.’131  
 Article 8, like Article 7, acknowledges the need for the socio-economic optimisation of 
intellectual property regulation. It implicitly recognizes that intellectual property protection 
often demands interventionist action to ensure that it does protect and/or promote social and 
economic objectives. Nevertheless, unlike Article 7, Article 8 expressly authorises State 
Parties to take specific action in pursuit of explicit, yet broadly defined, policy objectives.132  
Consequently, Article 8 would appear to be of greater substantive value than its neighbouring 
provision, Article 7. As observed by Carlos Correa, ‘Article 8 thus confirms the broad and 
unfettered discretion that Members have to pursue public policy objectives.’133 
However, Article 8 was clearly not intended to be an exception to the exclusive rights 
granted by the Agreement. Both paragraphs of Article 8 require that any measures adopted by 
Member must be consistent with the rest of the Agreement. Yet, it is important to assert that 
the consistency requirement should not overwhelm the application of this provision. To argue 
otherwise portrays intellectual property protection as ascendant over other national policies, 
and risks making Article 8 a superfluous provision contrary to established principles of 
international law. This cannot be the case. 134 As will be shown from the analysis of the 
terminology adopted, Article 8 articulates to Member States the significant discretion, even in 
light of the consistency requirement, that they hold to accommodate other important socio-
economic objectives. In doing so, it articulates principles that clearly assist in interpreting and 
                                                
130 Non-reciprocity means that ‘less-developed contracting parties should not be expected, in the course of trade 
negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade 
needs.’ Ad Article XXXVI Paragraph 8, General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1947, 55 UNTS 194. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Correa (n 5) 108; Gervais (n 26) 237. 
133 Correa (n 5) 108. 
134 Slade (n 9) 363-371. 
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applying the substantive rules of the Agreement, most significant of which are national 
regulatory autonomy, consistency, necessity and reasonableness.  
 
(a) The Terms of Article 8.1 
 
(i) ‘Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary...’ 
 
The opening phrase of Article 8 plainly recognises the independence State Parties have to 
institute suitable measures to control some of the negative consequences of intellectual 
property protection. These can arise either as a result of an intentional manipulation of the 
system or as an intrinsic side-effect of granting exclusive rights protection. It also recognises 
that intellectual property rights should not form a barrier to the regulation of other social and 
economic policy objectives. Such measures include the adaptation of intellectual property 
laws themselves,135 but may also include controls in other areas that impact upon the exercise 
of intellectual property rights, such as price controls and safety standards.136 However, as the 
measures relate to the formulation or amendment of ‘laws and regulations’ it can be assumed 
that administrative actions could not be justified under Article 8.1.137 
  The measures that may be taken could ostensibly support an increase in the levels of 
intellectual property protection. The key requirement being that the law is directed towards 
achieving the stated purposes, that is ‘to promote public health and nutrition, and to promote 
                                                
135 Aspects of TRIPS that provide flexibility for such measures include the exceptions to the rights granted 
(articles 13, 17 and 30); the lack of definitions for many of the substantive requirements (i.e. article 27 requires 
patentable subject matter to be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial application); and in 
relation to patent law, article 31 provides for the grant of compulsory licences. 
136 Correa (n 5) 104; Andrés Moncayo von Hase, ‘The Application and Interpretation of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual 
Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International 2008) 117. 
137 Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 195. 
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the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development.’ This is supported by Article 1.1 which states that, ‘Members may, but shall not 
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by the 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.’ For example, enhanced protection of traditional knowledge is directly aimed at 
attaining the stated objectives because it seeks to preserve traditional lifestyles and improve 
livelihoods, to conserve the environment, benefit national economies, and prevent bio-
piracy.138   Nevertheless, it is as an instrument to overcome the obstacles to development 
created by intellectual property protection that Article 8.1 could be most influential. 
Therefore, an effective operationalisation of this provision would likely see a reduction in the 
level of protection afforded.  
  The use of the term ‘necessary’ within Article 8.1 mirrors the wording within other 
WTO texts, where, as the ‘necessity test,’ it functions to control the autonomy State Parties 
have to ensure non-trade objectives.139 It attempts to distinguish between, or at least lessen 
the impact of, those national measures that legitimately pursue a non-trade objective (and as a 
consequence create barriers to free trade) and those protectionist policies that merely 
masquerade as sanctioned trade exceptions. It does this by ensuring that domestic measures 
that restrict trade are only tolerated if they are ‘necessary’ to mitigate against the obstruction 
of a fundamental national policy objective. For this reason, it is evident that the necessity test 
                                                
138 Carlos M Correa, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues and Options Surrounding the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge’ (2001) The Quaker United Office, 5-10. 
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/tkcol3.pdf  accessed 9 April 2016; Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property, 
Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2004) 97-100.  
139 Key WTO provisions that contain a ‘necessity’ requirement include Articles XX and XI of the GATT; 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Articles XIV and VI:4, paragraph 2(d) of Article XII and 
paragraph 5(e) of the Annex on Telecommunications; Articles 2.2 and 2.5 of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT); Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS); Articles 3.2, 8.1 and 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement; and Article 23.2 of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement.  
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in Article 8.1 is a limitation placed on Member States when acting under the authority of this 
provision. The other being the ‘consistency’ proviso, which will be discussed below.  
  ‘Necessity’ as interpreted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) objectively 
requires that the domestic measure pursue a policy expressed within the relevant provision. In 
the case of Article 8.1 that means public health and nutrition, and/or the promotion of the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological 
development. However, the jurisprudence of the WTO dictates that domestic measures which 
restrict trade will only be considered necessary (and thus WTO compliant) where, as 
summarised by Ruse-Khan, ‘they consist of the least trade restrictive measure; which is 
reasonably available to the Member State; and is equally effective in achieving the desired 
policy objective.’140  The Appellate Body has confirmed that it is not essential to show that 
the measure is ‘indispensable’ to achieving the objective, a more lenient and deferential 
approach has been adopted. In Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, the Appellate Body confirmed that it involved a ‘weighing and balancing’ of 
several  factors including, ‘the contribution made by the compliance measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or 
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or 
regulation on imports or exports.’141 
 The Appellate Body in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline has acknowledged that the policy objective pursued by State Parties is not the focus 
of the necessity requirement, but the measure adopted to pursue that objective is. This 
approach leaves Members free to determine their own policies in relation to objectives 
                                                
140 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Assessing the need for a General Public Interest Exception in TRIPS’ in 
Annette Kur (ed) Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
173 (emphasis added). For a detailed analysis of the DSB’s approach to the necessity test see Rodrigues (n 12) 
44-63. 
141 WTO, Korea: Measures Affecting the Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef – Report of the Appellate 
Body (11 December 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R [164]. 
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expressed. 142 The level of self-determination was further enhanced in European Communities 
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products when the Appellate Body 
confirmed that State Parties also retain the ‘right to determine the level of protection [in 
relation to the relevant policy] that it considers appropriate in a given situation.’143  
 Having observed that the policy objective is not justiciable, only the measure itself, it is 
important to note that the underlying policy is considered relevant when adjudicating on the 
necessity of the measure in question.144 The ‘weighing and balancing’ exercise offsets the 
relative importance of the national interest being advanced against the effectiveness of the 
measure and the extent of its impact upon trade.145 Sarah Joseph has observed that in the 
above cases ‘the Appellate Body has signalled a great willingness to concede the necessity of 
impugned measures when public health issues are at stake.’146 As considered below, this is 
significant for the application of the necessity test in Article 8.1, where ‘public health’ is 
prominent amongst the listed objectives. And while the WTO has stressed that Members must 
‘respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements,’147 
one would assume this includes the necessity requirement, which clearly mitigates the level 
of ‘respect’ commanded when acting in the interests of public health and the other interests 
outlines in Article 8.1.   
  Much of the case law in this area deals with the necessity standard as required by the 
‘General Exception’ provisions in Article XX(b) and (d) of the GATT, and Article XIV of the 
GATS. However, it would not be accurate to presume that the interpretation applied to the 
                                                
142 US – Gasoline (n 7) 29. WTO, ‘“Necessity Tests” in the WTO: Note by the Secretariat’ (2 December 2003) 
S/WPDR/W/27 [12]. 
143 WTO, European Communities: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products – Report of 
the Appellate Body (12 March 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R [168] . 
144 Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Who’s Afraid of Necessity? And Why it Matters?’ in Aik Hoe Lim and Bart De 
Meester. WTO Domestic Regulation and Services Trade: Putting Principles into Practice (CUP 2014) 97-98. 
145 Ibid 98. 
146 Sarah Joseph, Blame it on the WTO? A Human Rights Critique (OUP 2011) 113. See also Adam McBeth, 
International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Routledge 2010) 125.  
147 US-Gasoline (n 7) 29; WTO “Necessity Tests” (n 141) [12]. 
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necessity requirement in these instruments can be directly transposed onto the TRIPS 
Agreement. In fact it has been supposed that the necessity requirement in Article 8.1 is not as 
restrictive as that in Article XX of the GATT. 148 This is because Members, in ‘promot[ing] 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development’, would appear to have ‘significant room to define domestically the content and 
scope of the measures they can adopt.’149 The broad mandate expressed in Article 8.1 is also 
supported by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which declares that ‘the 
TRIPS Agreement does not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.’ 
It is also noteworthy that State Parties did not deem it necessary to restrict state action in this 
regard by including a requirement of necessity within the Doha Declaration.150  
This understanding aside, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that Article 8.1 is 
an ‘exceptions’ provision like Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV, GATS. Whilst all 
three articles include a list of potentially trade-restrictive measures that Members may adopt 
together with a necessity requirement, it is only the General Exceptions in the GATT and 
GATS that allow Members to directly override their obligations under the Agreements.151 
Article 8.1 is constrained by the requirement that all measures must be ‘consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.’152 As a result, it would appear that Members may only adopt 
such public interest measures if they can find sufficient space within the TRIPS provisions to 
do so.153  
                                                
148 WTO “Necessity Tests” (n 141) [4]. In contrast, Panagiotis Delimatsis states that ‘the GATT/WTO 
interpretation of the concept of necessity has converged across the WTO Agreements.’ Yet, his analysis only 
considers the GATT, GATS, TBT and SPS Agreements, with no reference being made to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Delimatsis (n 143) 96.  
149 Correa (n 5) 107. 
150 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (n 11); Yu (n 12) 1016. 
151 The measures that can be taken under Article XX of the GATT must conform to the ‘chapeau’ to avoid 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. A similar proviso is included in Article XIV of the GATS. 
152 Roffe (n 26) 126; Gervais (n 26) 238. 
153 Ruse-Khan (n 139) 195.  
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Therefore, while the underlying function of the necessity test is to constrain the amount 
of discretion Member States have in relation to public policy objectives, its limiting affect 
may be inconsequential by comparison to the obligation of TRIPS consistency. Hence, if a 
measure is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement it is unlikely to be challenged irrespective 
of its ‘necessity’ to achieve the stated objective.154 Nevertheless, the ‘necessity’ requirement 
may have greater application should non-violation complaints become recognised within the 
context of the TRIPS regime.155 
Unlike violation complaints which involve a breach of the terms of a WTO treaty, non-
violation complaints arise where a state alleges that the expectation of a ‘benefit accruing to it 
directly or indirectly ...is being nullified or impaired’ or ‘the attainment of any objective of 
the Agreement is being impeded’ by ‘the application by another contracting party of any 
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement.’156 Therefore, 
Member States may bring a complaint before the DSB where the action being taken by 
another Member is not illegal per se (does not violate an express treaty term), yet it does deny 
a legitimately expected gain arising from the Agreement.   
Notwithstanding the present inapplicability of non-violation complaints in the context of 
the TRIPS Agreement, it is clear that Article 8 may prove to be most valuable in this context. 
Member States who wish to adopt TRIPS consistent measures pursuant to the objectives 
expressed within this provision, such as price controls, licensing restrictions or packaging 
requirements, can use this provision as a defence against a claim that they were impairing the 
                                                
154 Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 117.  
155 A moratorium against non-violation complaints is currently maintained in accordance with articles 64.2 and 
64.3 TRIPS Agreement. 
156 GATT, art. XXIII. This article also provides for ‘situation complaints’. However, there is currently no 
jurisprudence on the application of this provision to the GATT and it has been suggested that these complaints 
are of little if any relevance. Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place’ (2000) 11 EJIL 763, 790-791.  Therefore, situation complaints will not be covered in this analysis.  
 
 
40 
legitimate benefits expected under the TRIPS Agreement.157 As explained below, Article 8 is 
an expression of the expectations of Members in relation to the Agreement and thus 
‘indicates that [Members] were reasonably expected to adopt such TRIPS-consistent 
measures.’158 The only restraint that could have a significant bearing would be the ‘necessity 
test’. This would operate to ensure that the adopted measure did not exceed what was 
objectively justified in the circumstances.  
 
 
(ii) ‘to protect public health and nutrition,...’ 
 
Article 8.1 makes clear that the measures taken by Member States are to be directed to 
achieving certain ends, the first being to protect public health and nutrition. As stated by the 
2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: - 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.159 
  This Declaration supports the ability of State Parties to take measures in support of 
public health160 that may, in fact, limit the grant and protection of intellectual property rights. 
                                                
157 Frederick M Abbott, ‘Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment Causes of Action under the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Fifth Ministerial Conference: A Warning and Reminder’ (2003) Quaker United Nations 
Office, Occasional Paper No. 11, 2. http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/QP11-nv.pdf   accessed 9 April 2016. 
158 Federick M Abbott, ‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial 
Conference’ (2001) Florida State University College of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper no. 
36, 26. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285934 accessed 9 April 2016.  
159 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (n 11) [4]. 
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Nevertheless the scope of Members’ discretion is seemingly constrained by the second 
sentence in the Declaration which acknowledges the use of flexibilities within the Agreement 
itself for achieving their public health objectives.161 This interpretation would appear to be in 
harmony with the requirement in Article 8.1 that any national measures are consistent with 
the provision of the TRIPS Agreement. However, as will be discussed below, this may not be 
so restrictive as it first appears.  
(iii) ‘and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development,...’ 
 
This is the second purpose to which Member State Parties may direct their necessary 
measures. It is immediately evident that national measures, in this context, need only 
‘promote’ the public interest rather than actually achieve the stated objective.162 As a result, 
any challenge to the legitimacy of such action will be much harder to establish. It is also clear 
from the language used that this second objective is extremely broad in its scope. Given that 
the measures adopted may include those within the scope of the intellectual property regime 
and those without, Carlos Correa has highlighted the significant room this provides for States 
when implementing and adapting their intellectual property policies.163  
The ‘public interest’ is a phrase often used to rationalise political, governmental and 
legal decision making at both the national and international level.164 Yet, it is a concept that 
                                                                                                                                                  
160 Public health in this context must be given a broad meaning. It should extend beyond pharmaceutical 
products to incorporate all IP that has some application within the public health sector. Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 
209. 
161 Roffe (n 26) 132. 
162 Correa (n 5) 105. 
163 Correa (n 5) 105-106. See also Ruse-Khan (n 139) 173; Roffe (n 26) 127. 
164 John D Montgomery, ‘Public Interest in Ideologies of National Development’ in Carl J Friedrich (ed), The 
Public Interest (Atherton Press 1962) 220. 
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appears devoid of a precise definition.165 The Oxford English Dictionary identifies it as ‘the 
common well-being’166 and is broadly understood to convey the message that the action or 
inaction in question has been undertaken because society, as a whole, will derive a benefit. 
As we have seen, intellectual property and trade are certainly sectors within which the public 
interest can be advanced. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not attempt to define any 
optimum levels of well-being to be targeted. In fact, it would be wrong to suppose that the 
‘public interest’ could be subject to an internationally recognised measure or definition. 
While political debates and judicial interpretations often provide context specific 
understandings of the term,167 perceptions of ‘common well-being’ and the philosophical 
origins of the ‘public interest’ inevitably vary amongst states. National perceptions of public 
interest are tied to economic, cultural, political and historical influences that are as numerous 
as they are variable.168 Accordingly, it is a reference point that policy makers can only 
legitimately begin to determine at the national level.169  
Turning to the phrase ‘of vital importance,’ once again it is only the individual Member 
States that can determine which sectors are of vital importance to their own socio-economic 
and technological development and thus where to take relevant action. While the term ‘vital 
importance’ would seem to stress the imperative nature of the sector in question, it is only the 
Member State who can determine which sectors are important to ‘their socio-economic and 
technological development.’170 As observed by Peter Yu, the only significant restriction on 
scope seems to come from within Article 27.1 of the patent provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which requires non-discrimination as to ‘the place of invention, the field of 
                                                
165 Gerhard Colm, ‘The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy’ in Carl J Friedrich (ed), The Public 
Interest (Atherton Press 1962) 115.  
166 OED (n 39). 
167 Colm (n 164) 127. 
168 Montgomery (n 163) 218.  
169 Roffe (n 26) 127; Correa (n 5) 105.  
170 Correa (n 5) 106; Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 196 (emphasis added). 
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technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.’171 Although, he does 
emphasis that this may not be relevant where sectors are identified not on the basis of their 
technological specialism, but on their size or stage of development, i.e. infant or small to 
medium-sized businesses.172  
Finally, the phrase ‘socio-economic and technological development’ must be seen to 
cover all aspects of a nation’s growth, and reflects the objectives outlined in the fifth recital 
of the Preamble to the Agreement.173 It is difficult if not impossible to conceive of an area of 
development that would not fall within the categories of social, economic or technological; or 
an area of intellectual property that would not be impacted by action taken under Article 
8.1.174 When deciding whether a sector is of ‘vital importance’ it is therefore possible for a 
Member State to look beyond the traditional indicators of development, such as Gross 
Domestic Product, income levels and total employment, and towards social indicators such as 
levels of health and education.175 As discussed above in relation to Article 7, technological 
development is a fundamental objective of intellectual property protection and the TRIPS 
Agreement. Yet, Article 8.1, together with Article 7, underscores that intellectual property 
protection can never prevail where to do so undermines other development objectives.  
 
(iv) ‘provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’ 
 
This has proved to be the most controversial expression within this provision. Article 8 
makes national autonomy to adopt appropriate measures conditional upon their compliance 
with the rest of the Agreement. At first sight it would be reasonable to conclude that Article 
                                                
171 Yu (n 12) 1011. 
172 Ibid, 1011-1012. 
173 Cottier and Véron (n 110) 32. 
174 Cottier and Véron (n 110) 33. 
175 Correa (n 5) 106.  
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8.1 is therefore almost redundant in application. However, this conclusion is drawn from too 
strict a reading of the proviso.  While Article 8.1 may not be a ‘general exception’ provision 
analogous to Article XX of the GATT, this does not mean that the provision is of 
insignificance. Together with Article 1.1 and Article 7, this provision has been described as a 
‘functional substitute’ to the General Exception provision of the GATT.176  Like Article 7, 
Article 8 has an interpretative function.177 It guides the national legislator when faced with 
implementing the often ambiguously worded substantive rules of the TRIPS Agreement. If 
we analyse the consistency requirement of Article 8 in light of the conditions placed upon the 
grant of exceptions to the exclusive rights, we can see that ‘consistency’ may not, in fact, be 
so hard to achieve given the uncertain nature of the exception provisions. For example, 
copyright limitations and exceptions should ‘not conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
work;178 copyright and trade mark exceptions must ‘take account of the legitimate interests of 
the owner;’179 and patent exceptions must ‘not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation’ of the right and must ‘not prejudice the legitimate interest of the owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.’180 In this interpretative role, Article 8 
skews in favour of the wider public interest when it comes into conflict with intellectual 
property policy.181 How the exceptions within the TRIPS Agreement are interpreted is 
important for giving practical application to the principles expressed in Article 8.182   
 In addition, Article 8 governs the interaction between intellectual property regulation and 
measures taken outside of intellectual property law and policy, for example competition 
regulation and public health. Correa notes that it would be illogical to suppose that the 
consistency requirement should prevent any TRIPS-inconsistent measures to protect the 
                                                
176 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 89. 
177 Roffe (n 26) 126; Abbott (n 157) 27.  
178 TRIPS Agreement, art 13 
179 Ibid, arts 13 and 17 
180 Ibid, art 30. 
181 Moncayo von Hase (n 135) 119. 
182 Musungu (n 108) 434. 
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national interests outlined in Article 8.1, as this would see intellectual property rights gain 
ascendency over other national policy objectives.183 In support of this opinion, the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health affirms that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Yet, as discussed, this is seemingly 
limited by the second sentence of paragraph 4, which reaffirms the right of Members to use 
the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement for this purpose.  In addition, the Doha 
understanding only relates to matters of public health and is not directly relevant for the other 
policy objectives expressed within Article 8.1.184 In these situations there is no express 
support for dispensing with the consistency requirement. Nevertheless, Correa is right to 
argue that intellectual property protection should and does not assume primacy over other 
policies. In which case, it may be better to acknowledge that the consistency requirement is 
there not because negotiators intended intellectual property rights to trump other national 
policies, but as an indicator that there is sufficient room within the other provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement to accommodate those policies whilst also respecting the protection of 
intellectual property rights.185 Therefore, returning to the first point above, Article 8.1 is an 
interpretative tool that asserts the rights of Members to favour other policies should the 
national situation so dictate, and that any challenge to Members discretion should carry the 
burden of establishing that the measure is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.186 As 
observed by Andres Moncayo von Hase, ‘Articles 7 and 8 impose on Members the 
correlative obligation to refrain from questioning acts of other Members that make use of the 
                                                
183 Correa (n 5)108. 
184 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss argue that ‘While the declaration was made in the context of a health crisis and 
precipitated an amendment to the Agreement, [it] was…not confined to that context and was viewed as 
explaining-not modifying-the Agreement’ (n 3) 110. In which case, the ability of Members to derogate from 
their obligations under TRIPS extends not only to public health, but also to the other policy objectives listed. 
Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 206-213.  
185 As noted by Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, ‘[The consistency] language is puzzling but it is highly significant 
because, in fact, it confirms that the Agreement as a whole is flexible and furnishes states with considerable 
room to manoeuvre.’ (n 3)111.  
186 Roffe (n 26) 126; Correa (n 5) 108. 
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freedom conferred to them by the said provisions.’187 Consequently the consistency proviso 
appears to merely determine the outer limits of that discretion rather than removing it 
completely.188  
 Importantly, when assessing the consistency of such measures it must be remembered 
that Article 7, and its requirements of social and economic welfare and a balance of rights 
and obligations, must be taken into account as the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.189 
‘Consistent with the provisions of this Agreement’ means all the provisions, including Article 
7. Therefore, the consistency enquiry cannot ignore that the optimum levels of intellectual 
property protection relate to national levels of development, as required by Article 7, which 
must necessarily include ‘public health and nutrition’ and ‘socio-economic and technological 
development.’ A national measure which may appear inconsistent with some of the standards 
expressed within the TRIPS Agreement may not be considered inconsistent with the 
Agreement if read as a whole.190 
 In conclusion, the consistency requirement means that Article 8.1 is not a General 
Exceptions provision akin to Article XX of the GATT, as it does not generally authorise 
Members to override the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (notwithstanding that the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health may make an exception for public health 
policies) and it appears to have no substantive application on its own.191 However, it does not 
prevent Members from adapting their intellectual property laws to accommodate the stated 
policy concerns where ambiguity or flexibility exists within the substantive provisions of the 
Agreement. As long as one or more of the stated objectives is the genuine intention behind 
                                                
187 Moncayo von Hase (n 135) 118. 
188 Yusuf observes that, ‘The consistency test was apparently considered necessary in view of the broad nature 
of the public interest principle.’ (n 42) 14. 
189 Correa (n 5) 104 &110; Yu (n 12) 1014; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 110-111. 
190 Yusuf (n 42) 14. 
191 Cottier and Véron (n 110) 32. 
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the measure and is not a disguised attempt to weaken the protection provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement, states are free to act.192  
 
(b) Article 8.2 
 
(i) ‘Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed...’ 
 
While Article 8.1 authorises measures ‘of a positive nature’, Article 8.2, authorises Member 
States to take ‘defensive’ action to prevent or resolve any adverse consequences created by 
the behaviour of intellectual property rights owners.193 As with Article 8.1, this provision 
requires that national measures taken upon the authority of this provision must be consistent 
with the rest of the Agreement. Therefore, competition law should not be used as a hidden 
restraint on the rights provided by the TRIPS Agreement.194 In this regard, the discussion in 
relation to the consistency proviso in Article 8.1 is equally relevant here.  
One noticeable difference between the authorisation provided by Articles 8.1 and 8.2 is 
that the former requires such measures to be ‘necessary’, whereas the latter requires the 
measures to be ‘appropriate’ and ‘needed’. Given that the term ‘necessary’ denotes a specific 
legal norm within the WTO and ‘appropriate’ does not, it is possible to presume that 
Members may be afforded greater autonomy when it comes to adopting measures under 
Article 8.2, subject to the consistency requirement. Gervais advances the argument that 
‘“appropriate” refers to the need for correlation between the measure (nature and 
                                                
192 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss (n 3) 111. 
193 Correa (n 5) 110. 
194 Frederick M Abbott, ‘Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS Agreement Adequate?’ (2004) 7 J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 687, 692. 
 
 
48 
proportionality) and the abuse or unreasonable restraint that is its target.’195 If this 
‘correlation’ requires a proportionality type assessment similar to that discussed in relation to 
the ‘necessity’ test then there would seem little reason for departing from the terminology 
adopted in Article 8.1.196 Hence, it would seem logical, and in accordance with principles of 
treaty interpretation, to conclude that ‘appropriate’ signifies a lesser level of scrutiny for 
national measures. An alternative explanation for this distinction may be that, unlike the 
policy objectives listed in Article 8.1, the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual 
arrangements is covered in some detail by Article 40 of the Agreement. This makes it 
unnecessary for Article 8.2 to include a further limitation when the discretion afforded to 
Member States is controlled by another provision.  Although, it must be noted that the level 
of direction afforded by Article 40 is far from comprehensive.  
The term ‘needed’ has also been equated with that of ‘necessary’ in Article 8.1, 197 and 
there is certainly a relationship between the ordinary understanding given to both terms. Yet, 
once again we must question why State Parties chose to depart from the use of the word 
necessary, and thus the established WTO ‘necessity’ principle, if there was no intention to 
adopt a different benchmark. It is reasonable to argue that ‘needed’ may merely refer to a 
requirement for Member States to show that some action was required and thus the measure 
was adopted in good faith.198 Nevertheless, what is clear from the discussion below is that 
                                                
195 Gervais (n 26) 239-240. See also Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 213. 
196 Interestingly, in his book on WTO principles, Mitchell equates the term ‘necessary’ in Article 8.1 with a 
proportionality type analysis, but does not do the same with the term ‘appropriate’ or ‘needed’ in Article 8.2. 
Mitchell (n 121) 180 (Table B). 
197 Gervais (n 26) 239. 
198 Gervais, in a more recent article, has noted the overlap that exists with the ‘necessity’ requirement in Article 
8 and the ‘justification’ test in Article 20 of TRIPS. Yet, he acknowledges that justification may not be as 
stringent a requirement as the necessity test – ‘justification may be interpreted as meaning that the measure 
should implement the stated objective without necessarily being the least trade restrictive.’ This same reasoning 
may be equally applicable in distinguishing between ‘necessity’ and ‘needed’. Daniel Gervais, ‘Analysis of the 
Compatibility of Certain Tobacco Product Packaging Rules and the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris 
Convention’ (2010) Report prepared for Japan Tobacco International http://www.smoke-free.ca/trade-and-
tobacco/Resources/Gervais.pdf accessed 9 April 2016. 
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Member States can only intervene under this provision when the activities of private owners 
produce negative effects for competition, trade or technology transfer.199  
 
(ii) ‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders...’  
 
The TRIPS Agreement was introduced to remedy perceived distortions to competition that a 
lack of adequate intellectual property protection was having in the market place.200 In this 
regard intellectual property protection is an important aspect of a competitive trading 
environment.201 Yet, the exclusive rights granted to intellectual property owners can also be 
abused to produce negative consequences for trade and competition both nationally and 
internationally.202 Indeed, during the Uruguay Round, it was this aspect alone that India felt 
needed regulating by the WTO (or the GATT as it was at the time). As stated by the Indian 
delegation, ‘it was only the restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of 
intellectual property rights that can be considered to be trade-related because they alone 
distort or impede international trade.’203 Consequently, the initial proposals to incorporate 
                                                
199 Hanns Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Rules and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS 
Perspective’ in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman (eds) International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology Under a Globalised Intellectual Property Regime (CUP 2005) 732. 
200 Thomas Cottier and Ingo Meitinger, ‘The TRIPs Agreement without a Competition Agreement?’ (2003) 
Fondazone Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper no. 65-99. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=200622  accessed 9 April 2016.  
201 Andreas Heinemann, ‘Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPs Agreement of the World Trade 
Organisation’ in Fredrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds) From GATT to TRIPS: The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (VCH Publishers 1996) 241. 
202 For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the General Court has on several 
occasions addressed the issue of ‘abuse of a dominant position’ in relation to the exercise of IPRs. Cases include 
C-241-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications v E.C. Commission (Magill TV 
guide Limited intervening) [1995] ECR I-743; C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG  v NDC Health GmbH 
& Co. KG [2004] ECR I-5039; T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
ECR II-3601. 
203 GATT, ‘Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights: Communication from India’ (10 July 1989) MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37 [2]; See also Roffe (n 26) 
121. 
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provisions relating to anti-competitive practices came from developing countries.204 It is the 
balance between appropriate levels of intellectual property protection and competition 
regulation that the opening recital to the TRIPS Agreement seeks to attain.205 In this regard, 
the regulation of intellectual property rights in accordance with competition policy is seen by 
the WTO Membership as essential to ensure the effectiveness of the system.  
Article 8.2 allows the overall balance between intellectual property protection and 
competition rules to be resolved at the national level. It neither attempts to define what 
practices are to be considered abusive, nor stipulates what measures Members should adopt. 
It once again exhibits deference to national policy makers to tailor rules and principles to suit 
national circumstances.206 This is an approach favoured by some commentators who view 
WTO regulation of competition rules as potentially restrictive for many nations, and the 
WTO unsuitable for the task.207  In discussing the impact of implementing multilateral rules 
and principles on competition policy, Correa maintains that ‘The best option for [developing] 
countries may be to keep the possibility of establishing their competition regimes, according 
to their own situation and policy objectives, without being bound to rules that may be 
enforced through the WTO settlement mechanism.’208  
The ability to control abusive practices can be addressed from within the TRIPS regime 
itself. As noted above, there is significant ambiguity in many of the substantive rules to allow 
Members to adopt pro-competitive intellectual property policies. In addition, Article 40 
                                                
204 GATT, ‘Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, 
Tanzania and Uruguay’ (14 May 1990) MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71. 
205 TRIPS Agreement, preamble recital 1. 
206 Ullrich observes that the reservation maintained in favour of preserving national autonomy in relation to 
competition policy and rules may be a concession made by developed nations following the collapse of 
negotiations in relation to a Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology. Ullrich (n 198) 731-732.  
207 Daniel K Tarullo, ‘Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy’ (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 478; 
Cecilia Oh, ‘Trade and Competition Policy in the WTO’ (2003) Third World Network Briefings for Cancun. 
http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/article/trade-and-competition-policy-wto  accessed 9 April 2016. Cf. 
Keith Maskus and Mohamed Lahouel, who argue that a multilateral agreement incorporating minimum 
standards on competition policy would benefit developing countries. ‘Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Rights in Developing Countries’ (2000) 23 World Economy 595. 
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authorises Members to regulate anti-competitive licensing practices of rights holders;209 
Article 6 on exhaustion of rights allows Member States to adopt their own policy and 
regulation on the matter;210and the rules, for example, on fair use and compulsory licensing 
also expressly assist to counter abusive practices.211   
Beyond intellectual property policy, abusive practices can be subject to varying degrees 
of national regulation. The abuse of rights is a concept that has been notoriously difficult to 
universally define. In the absence of a multilateral agreement on competition rules and 
policy, 212 members are free to determine what practices are to be defined as abusive and how 
to regulate them.213  Thus, taken together with Article 7, this provision would allow Member 
States to utilise competition rules to ensure that intellectual property rights holders are not 
over-compensated in relation to their social and economic contribution. 
 
(iii) ‘or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade...’  
 
Here again Article 8.2 is formulated to allow Member States the autonomy to regulate the 
practices of private business. The intention is to prevent activities that impact upon the 
                                                
209 Article 40 is again a permissive provision as it does not define specific competition rules, it merely identifies 
example practices that may amount to abuse of rights, such as ‘exclusive grantback conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing.’  
210 This autonomy was reaffirmed in the WTO, ‘Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health’ (n 11) [5(d)]. 
211 TRIPS Agreement, art 31(c) & (k). The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health reinforces the right of 
Member States to grant compulsory licences and the freedom of each state to determine the grounds upon which 
the licences are granted (n 11) [5(b)]. 
212 For a detailed discussion on a possible  WTO Agreement on competition rules see, for example,  
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business: A “Trade 
Law Approach” for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO’ (1996-1997) 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 545.  
David J Gerber, ‘Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship’ (2007) 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 707.  
213 Heinemann cautions against placing too much reliance on the interpretation of ‘abusive’ in different contexts. 
To do so may lead ‘to a premature narrowing of the scope of application. To cite an example, to equate “abuse” 
with the meaning of the same term in Art [102] of the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] would 
fail to recognise that in the latter Treaty a dominant market position is required, whereas Art. 8(2) merely 
requires the existence of a right in the field of intellectual property, which does not necessarily entail a dominant 
position in the relevant market.’ (n 200) 243. 
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fundamental objective of WTO policy – unrestricted trade.214 There is clearly an overlap 
between this objective and the previous concern over abuse of rights. Yet, the ability to 
control abusive practices would appear to be wider given that some abusive practices may not 
in fact be considered anti-competitive and thus not an unreasonable restraint on trade, 
whereas any anti-competitive practice will always be abusive.215 
 The term reasonable (or variations of, including unreasonably) appears more than 200 
times in the legal texts of the WTO, and over 30 in the TRIPS Agreement.216 It is often used 
as a means to limit the nature and extent of measures States are authorised to make.217 As in 
Article 8.2, States are only authorised to act if the practice in question unreasonably restrains 
trade. Within the context of the TRIPS Agreement, Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg 
observe that the ‘unreasonableness’ of an action or inaction requires an assessment of 
whether or not it is ‘proportionate or within the limits of reason.’218  
Whether a practice ‘unreasonably’ restrains trade appears to require the Member State to 
undertake an investigation into the actual impact the conduct has upon trade before adopting 
any pro-competitive measures that may negatively affect intellectual property rights. As 
emphasised by the much quoted Justice Brandeis in the 1918 US Supreme Court decision in 
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,  every contractual agreement restrains trade to 
some extent it is only those that do so unreasonably that warrant legal scrutiny.219 What 
                                                
214 TRIPS Agreement, preamble recital 1. 
215 Correa (n 5) 111; Yusuf (n 42) 15. See also, Pires de Carvalho (n 26) 232, where the author observes that 
while selling at different prices to different consumers based on unreasonable grounds of discrimination (i.e. the 
football team supported) is not anti-competitive, it may certainly be considered abusive practice.  
216 Graham Cook, ‘Reasonableness in WTO Law’ (2013) 1 Lat. Amer. J. Int’l Tr. L. 713, 714. 
217 For example, the TRIPS Agreement (articles 13, 26 & 30) only allows exceptions to be introduced when, 
inter alia, they ‘do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests’ of the rights holder; and the GATS 
Annex on Telecommunications section 5(g) states that ‘a developing country may, consistent with its level of 
development, place reasonable conditions on access to and use of public telecommunications…’ 
218 Sam Ricketson & Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 776. While the authors make this statement in relation to Article 
9.2 of the Berne Convention, it is applicable in the context of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 9.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement expressly incorporates articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the Agreement.  
219 Board of Trade of Chicago v United States (1918) 246 US 231, 238 
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amounts to unreasonable restraint was articulated in what has become commonly known as 
the ‘rule of reason’ doctrine: - 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or 
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good 
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but 
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences.220 
 
While this private law doctrine has necessarily evolved over time, and finds application in 
many jurisdictions, the essence of the analysis remains true today.221 Therefore, this 
established balancing test would appear equally applicable for WTO Members when making 
a determination as to whether certain restrictive intellectual property practices warrant 
regulatory measures to be taken.222  
 
(iv) ‘or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.’ 
 
Conduct of intellectual property owners that could affect the international transfer of 
technology include many of the licensing practices covered by Article 40, and the grant of 
compulsory licences in accordance with Article 31. As expressed in Article 7, one of the 
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is the ‘transfer and dissemination of technology.’ This 
                                                
220 Ibid. 
221 For an analysis of how the ‘rule of reason’ has developed in the US see Andrew I Gavil, ‘Moving Beyond 
Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice’ (2012) 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 733. For an 
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Rethinking another Classic of European Legal Doctrine (2005 Europa Law Publishing). 
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was a key factor in persuading many developing countries to agree to the TRIPS Agreement 
being incorporated into the legal framework of the WTO. Given that the main source of 
technology transfer for many developing countries is that acquired from overseas,223 it was 
crucial that developing Members were given the tools to ensure, as far as possible, that the 
promised benefits of intellectual property protection accrued. In this regard Article 8.2, 
together with Article 66.2, are important provisions that seek to promote the international 
transfer of technology.224 Yet it is only the former provision that places credible control in the 
hands of all recipient nations. 
 
(c) Summary 
 
In sanctioning Member States to adopt measures in relation to certain policy objectives 
Article 8 appears to have greater substantive authority than its neighbouring provision, 
Article 7. Yet this authority is curtailed by the inclusion of a consistency requirement. While 
the controls of necessity and reasonableness merely seek to ensure that the measures adopted 
are not disguised restrictions on trade, the consistency requirement seemingly prevents 
Article 8 having free-standing authority to directly override other obligations expressed 
within the TRIPS Agreement.  In requiring consistency Article 8 acts as a ‘rule of restraint 
for national policies.’ But just how restraining is that rule? The policy objectives expressed 
within the provision are wide in scope and not clearly defined, leaving Members significant 
discretion on how to develop that policy. In addition, the provisions within the Agreement 
that Members could use to support a consistency argument, i.e. Articles 13, 17, 30 and 40, are 
themselves open to broad interpretation in light of the objectives and principles expressed in 
                                                
223 Musungu (n 108) 445. 
224 The importance of Article 66.2 was given emphasis in the WTO Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (n 
11) [7]. 
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Articles 7 and 8. As noted by Reichman, ‘In principle, both the public interest exception and 
measures to prevent abuse, respectively stipulated in Article 8(1) and 8(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, could justify resort to compulsory licensing.’225 Therefore, the consistency 
requirement may not be as restrictive as it first appears.  
 Accordingly, the true value of Article 8 rests in its ability to guide the interpretation of 
other provisions of the Agreement. Many provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are vague and 
uncertain in legal application and thus would benefit from the guidance provided by Article 
8, even if it is only to authorise deference to national standards where such measures are 
adopted in good faith. Therefore, Article 8 is a complementary provision to Article 7 that is 
important for framing not only intellectual property laws but also rules relating to other 
public interests such as health and competition.226 
 
(d) Identified Principles of Law 
The WTO Panel in EC – TMs & GIs has acknowledged that ‘Article 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement sets out the principles of that agreement.’227 This is important in understanding 
the legal authority of this provision. As observed by Andrew Mitchell, ‘a text supporting two 
readings should be interpreted in a manner consonant with a treaty’s underlying 
principles.’228 Thus, when specific legal principles can be identified within the text of an 
agreement they inevitably carry greater interpretative weight than the more general 
                                                
225 Jerome H Reichman, ‘Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS 
Component of the WTO Agreement’ in Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and 
International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International 2008) 34. 
226 Correa (n 5) 104. 
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56 
expressions of object and purpose.229 Notwithstanding that the interpretation and application 
of these legal principles is still influenced by the overall object and purpose of the treaty.  
While the panel does not identify any specific legal principles emanating from Article 8, 
it is clear from the above analysis that each of the requirements of consistency, necessity and 
reasonableness operate as legal principles. In this role they guide the application of the 
relevant legal rules and, in doing so, validate and justify the scope of the Agreement. Yet, it 
would be wrong to let the nomenclature of Article 8 be so restrictive as to deny that same role 
to its neighbour, Article 7. As mentioned above, the Panel in US – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998 characterised the phrase ‘[t]he protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute...to a balance of rights and obligations’ 
contained within Article 7 as a ‘form of the good faith principle.’230  
In addition, it is also possible to identify a legal principle that finds its origins in the 
language of both Articles 7 and 8. The principle of national regulatory autonomy or 
sovereignty is clearly a guiding principle in several key policy areas, such as health and 
competition, and when implementing the often ambiguous obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement. As discussed throughout this paper, the policy objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement can only be truly defined and balanced at the national level. While the principles 
of consistency, necessity and reasonableness may limit the scope of that autonomy, any 
challenge to the principle of national regulatory autonomy must necessarily carry the burden 
of establishing the action or inaction as inconsistent, unnecessary, etc.  
                                                
229 As noted by Isabelle van Damme, ‘Principles of treaty interpretation are neither rules nor principles in the 
classic sense of “something . . . which underlies a rule, and explains or provides the reason for it”.  They 
underlie the interpretation of the rule, not the rule itself.’ Isabelle van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the 
WTO Appellate Body’ (2010) 21 EJIL 605, 616. 
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The legal principles so far identified as being expressed within both Articles 7 and 8 are 
reasonably unambiguous in their objectives, and relatively familiar to judicial adjudicators. 
However, this is not to say that their boundaries and application will be or are easy to define. 
Caution must be stressed in an intergovernmental organisation such as the WTO, where the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding makes it clear that the ‘Recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.’231 Nevertheless, this caution must be balanced against the need to recognise the 
legal and interpretative principles as articulated by its members. Given that these principles 
are expressed within Articles 7 and 8 it is significant that the terms of reference of the DSU 
require that any matter of dispute be examined ‘in the light of the relevant provisions of the 
covered agreements.’232  
 In summary, legal principles are plainly expressed within both Articles 7 and 8, although 
it is only the principle of ‘good faith’ that has been definitively recognised by the DSB. 
Whilst above the analysis is not conclusive, it is reasonable to presume that the legal 
principles that have been identified can effectively function to guide the interpretation of the 
substantive rules of the Agreement. This guidance derives from a direct use of the legal 
principle to shape the applicable rule. If applied in this way, the legal principles articulated in 
Articles 7 and 8 give expression to the broader intentions of all the parties to the Agreement. 
Article 7 and 8, therefore, demarcate the scope of the Agreement and legitimise its 
application amongst all Member States. They also provide the foundation for some of the 
expectations that Members should derive from the implementation of the Agreement and are 
therefore important provisions should non-violation complaints become an aspect of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
 
                                                
231 DSU (n 23) art 3.2. 
232 Ibid, art 7.1. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In conceptualising the meaning and function of Articles 7 and 8 from the language of the text, 
it seems evident that these provisions should be of fundamental importance in defining the 
scope of the TRIPS Agreement. As expressed by Meinhard Hilf, ‘Any established rule in a 
legal system should be an expression of a finely tuned balance between the underlying 
principles and objectives.’233 This approach  is in accordance with the General Rule of Treaty 
Interpretation expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
requiring inter alia that a treaty be interpreted in light of its object and purpose. Therefore, 
Articles 7 and 8, entitled Objectives and Principles, provide a system that calibrates the rest 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Analysis of the text also confirms that this process of calibration 
can only sensibly be achieved at the national level given the breadth and complexity of social 
and economic issues in question. Therefore, where ambiguity exists within the provisions of 
the Agreement deference must be made to the individual choices of member states, as long as 
they are aimed at achieving the goals articulated in Article 7 or are authorised by Article 8.234  
In addition, the outcomes that these provisions seek to achieve reflect a balance of 
interests arising from an extensive period of negotiations and to ignore them makes it ‘very 
hard to make a good faith argument that the TRIPS Agreement was a legitimate bargain 
between developed and less-developed countries.’235 As tools for validating and justifying the 
scope of the TRIPS Agreement it is important to recognise that they also implicitly 
incorporate the development goals of the WTO. 236 Yet this is not to misconstrue these 
provisions as instruments that only have value for the less developed membership of the 
                                                
233 Hilf (n 128) 112. 
234 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting 
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together’ (1997) 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 275, 304; Frankel (n 9) 393-394. 
235 Yu (n 12) 1023. 
236 Roffe (n 26) 130. 
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WTO. Clearly Articles 7 and 8 also reflect intellectual property policy that has long been a 
staple of national regimes. Whether as expressing legal principles, legitimate expectations or 
defining the outcomes of an optimised intellectual property regime, these two provisions 
provide important interpretative guidance to all members and institutions of the WTO. 
Greater trust in the value of the TRIPS Agreement can only be achieved through the 
application of its objectives and principles, which can only effectively be applied once a 
better understanding has been articulated. It is hoped that this article goes some way to 
providing much clarity to the text, such that legal and political representatives can have 
greater confidence in their future application. Given that the text of Articles 7 and 8 is being 
steadily replicated in other intellectual property agreements, it is only through an 
understanding of these objectives and principles that we fully appreciate how international 
intellectual property regulation is to function.  
